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ABSTRACT 
We investigate whether a firm’s disclosure policy is affected by the changing corporate 
setting and intensified corporate governance associated with private equity (PE) investments. 
For a unique sample of unquoted PE backed firms we observe a significant switch to 
increased financial disclosure in the pre-investment year, consistent with the hypothesis that 
entrepreneurs attempt to reduce information asymmetries inherent to the PE application by 
increasing their disclosure levels. Further, we document that the governance and 
professionalization impact of PE investors affects their portfolio firms’ financial disclosure 
positively. Finally, differentiating on investor type (government versus non-government 
related) reveals no overall effect on disclosure, both in the pre- as in the post-investment 
years. Results are robust to various sensitivity checks.  
 
(JEL classification: G30, M10, M41) 
Keywords: Disclosure, private equity, unlisted firms, monitoring, corporate governance. 
 
4 
INTRODUCTION 
Since decades, corporate decisions to disclose information to outsiders have been of 
interest for both analytical and empirical accounting researchers. This issue is of major 
importance as economic theory suggests that a firm’s disclosure policy is negatively related to 
its cost of capital since disclosure reduces information asymmetries. Analytical studies have 
modeled the discretionary disclosure of information in various settings resulting in full 
disclosure (Grosman 1981, Milgrom 1981) and partial disclosure equilibria (Bhattacharya and 
Ritter (1983), Verecchia (1983), Diamond and Verecchia (1991), Gigler (1994)). Empirical 
work on corporate disclosure is rooted in the 1960s and typically examines the effect of 
increased levels of disclosure on a firm's ability to reduce agency costs. However, results of 
these studies are mixed. Other studies focus explicitly on the interaction between a firm’s 
corporate governance structure and its disclosure policy. Again, results are mixed: authors 
find both positive and negative relations between the intensity of a firm’s corporate 
governance structure and its disclosure policy.  
The current study is situated in the latter stream of research, in that we study the 
impact of changes in ownership structure and corporate governance on a firm’s disclosure 
policy. More specifically, we examine disclosure policies of a large hand-collected sample of 
Belgian unlisted firms receiving private equity (PE) financing from professional equity 
investment companies, both in the period before and after the PE investment.1 The motivation 
for using this dataset stems from the unique Belgian institutional and legal framework which 
requires all national companies (both listed and unlisted) to file yearly financial statements to 
the National Bank of Belgium. This offers a richness of financial statement information and 
provides the opportunity to study the effect of a change in ownership and governance 
structure resulting from the PE investment on a firm’s disclosure policy, even when firms are 
not subject to stock exchange reporting requirements. Further, this dataset is unique in that it 
contains (changes in) firm-specific disclosure observations around a clearly identified PE 
financing event and thus allows to study corporate disclosure policies as a response to 
information-asymmetries and agency problems inherent to the PE offering. As such, this 
research takes into account that disclosure decisions are non-random events and responds to 
the worry of researchers that disclosure is often treated independently from a firm’s changing 
environment or economics (Healy and Palepu (2001)).  
A study like this is interesting for several reasons. Studies on unlisted firms is 
appealing in its own right, due to the predominance of private companies in the economy and 
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the fact that only marginal attention has been paid to these kind of firms in empirical studies.2 
Moreover, the PE setting is particularly interesting since it is characterized by various 
information asymmetries and agency problems which inherently affect the business process 
and organization. Therefore, the use of financial statement information is important in a PE 
context, even for unlisted firms (Hand (2005)). We acknowledge the importance of financial 
statement information and study the relation between the (nearby) governance of a PE 
investor and a firm’s disclosure policy. Hereby, the current study not only complements 
accounting research on determinants of disclosure but also entrepreneurial finance research 
which often treats the corporate reporting environment as exogenous.  
We argue that a firm discloses more information to the outside world when raising PE 
finance and derive this argument from basic economic theory. The information asymmetry 
problem that typically arises between a better-informed entrepreneur and outside PE investors 
gives rise to the lemons problem, which causes good and bad projects to be valued at an 
average level (Akerlof (1970)). In an attempt to resolve this problem, the best entrepreneurs 
signal their superior quality and increased disclosure might be a valuable instrument to do so. 
Various studies have shown that financial figures are key determinants in screening and 
selecting portfolio companies, especially in Continental Europe (MacMillan, Zemann and 
Subbanarasimha (1987); Fried and Hisrich (1994); Wright and Robbie (1998); Manigart et al. 
(2000)). Moreover, survey evidence shows that more than 70% of professional investors 
labels accounting disclosure as the most important item which impacts their investment 
decision (McKinsey (2002)). Consequently, we argue that high quality entrepreneurs 
showcase their financial reporting openness and professionalism to outsiders by increasing 
their disclosure levels. We therefore expect and also find evidence of increased disclosure of 
financial information in the year before firms get PE.  
Second, we argue that portfolio firms’ disclosure policies are affected by PE investors’ 
governance. This argument originates from the well-illustrated phenomenon that PE investors 
are close monitors of their portfolio firms (Gompers (1995), Sapienza, Manigart and Vermeir 
(1996), Kaplan and Strömberg (2002)). These monitoring efforts are particularly driven by the 
agency problem, as described in Jensen and Meckling (1976), where the interests of principals 
(here: PE investors) and agents (here: entrepreneurs-managers) are not perfectly aligned. As a 
response to the agency problems, PE investors are intensively involved in their portfolio 
firms’ day-to-day activities and contract a substantial number of controls like cash flow and 
control rights contingent upon observed performance measures (Gompers (1995), Robbie and 
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Wright (1998), Gompers and Lerner (2001), Kaplan and Strömberg (2002)). This strong PE 
investor involvement results in a substantial change in governance and positively affects the 
professionalism the firm is operating with. We argue and show that this intensified 
governance and professionalization is noticeable in the way financial reporting is conducted 
and, as such, is manifested in a higher disclosure of financial information to outsiders.  
To document these propositions empirically, we study disclosure policies of a large 
sample of unlisted Belgian PE backed firms from (at most) 3 years before until (at most) 5 
years after they received PE for the first time in their history, and compare these with a 
matched sample of independent firms that never received PE. Since the firms under analysis 
are unlisted and press releases or extended annual reports are rare for these kind of firms, we 
gauge a firm’s disclosure behavior by looking at its willingness to report complete (i.e. more 
detailed) financial statements when abbreviated (i.e. shorter in length, providing less detail) 
statements are sufficient to comply with legal requirements. Complete financial statements 
require more intensive preparation and financial expertise and contain more competitive 
information. Hence, complete financial statement disclosers incur substantially higher 
proprietary costs than firms which only report abbreviated financial statements. In the pre-PE 
financing period one would only expect firms to switch to a complete financial statement 
reporting if the increase in proprietary costs resulting from the increased disclosure is offset 
by the decrease in information asymmetry. After the PE investment it is likely that the 
financial expertise, the intensified monitoring and professionalism of the PE investor will be 
dominant, leading to expectations of a higher disclosure policy when professional PE 
investors become involved.  
Through panel data analyses, we find that PE portfolio firms partly resolve the 
information asymmetry gap by disclosing significantly more financial statement information 
than they are legally obliged to, especially in the pre-PE financing year. These differences 
remain significant when we control for firm-specific characteristics and potential endogeneity 
problems. From the PE investment year onwards, PE backed firms are even more likely to 
disclose complete financial statements compared to both the matched sample and the pre-
investment firm-years. This finding suggests a clear governance and professionalization 
impact of PE investors on their portfolio firms’ disclosure behavior. Further, we condition for 
differences in investor type by splitting our sample in government PE backed and non-
government PE backed firms. We expect that the lower monitoring and governance impact 
which is often associated with government-related PE investors will yield lower disclosure 
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levels for their portfolio firms. Results, however, do not support this view although 
government PE backed firms switch earlier to a high disclosure strategy. This suggests that 
the well-documented difference in governance and professionalization between government 
and non-government PE investors has no sizeable effects on the way financial disclosure of 
their portfolio firms is enforced.   
The current study has several contributions. First, this study distinguishes itself from 
the traditional disclosure literature which studies governance structures in relation to a firm’s 
disclosure behavior. Prior studies typically associate proxies for a firm’s governance structure 
with aggregate measures of disclosure tendencies (Raffournier (1995), Ho and Wong (2001), 
Eng and Mak (2003)). However, these studies face the problem of being short of good proxies 
for a firm’s governance structure which often results into mixed results. The firms analyzed in 
the current study are unique in that they contain an indisputable change in governance system 
resulting from the PE involvement. This provides an exclusive setting to study the impact of 
intensified scrutiny and governance pressure on a firm’s disclosure behavior. Second, prior 
studies typically investigate disclosure tendencies of publicly listed companies, primarily 
driven by data unavailability of unlisted firms. However, recent evidence shows that financial 
statement information matters for unlisted firms, especially in a PE context, and that this issue 
is surprisingly neglected in the literature (Hand (2005)). The current study acknowledges this 
shortcoming and enhances the understanding of the use of disclosure for unlisted firms in 
response to increased scrutiny and governance by PE investors. Third, most studies analyze 
disclosure behavior cross-sectionally and typically neglect intertemporal dependencies. 
However, disclosure decisions are non-random events and cannot be treated independently 
from a firm’s changing environment or economics (Healy and Palepu (2001)). The current 
study overcomes this disregard and exploits the characteristics of a longitudinal dataset to 
analyze the disclosure evolution in a panel data context.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the corporate disclosure literature. In 
section 3, we build hypotheses by combining the PE framework and the disclosure setting. In 
section 4, we describe the research setting, explore the characteristics of the Belgian PE 
industry and illustrate the sample properties. In section 5, detailed statistics are provided and 
section 6 reports the results of our multivariate analyses. Finally, section 7 concludes and 
discusses the results.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature on disclosure, both analytical and empirical, is extensive and typically 
focuses on the interplay between information asymmetries and disclosure policy. Information 
asymmetries create costs by introducing adverse selection in transactions between economic 
agents (Akerlof (1970)). It is commonly accepted that a firm can reduce the level of 
information asymmetries by committing itself to disclose more information to the outside 
world. Analytical studies on disclosure policy have been pioneered by Grosman (1981) and 
Milgrom (1981). These studies find that economic agents are better off by adopting a full 
disclosure policy since incomplete disclosure results in buyers’ suspicion and, as a 
consequence, high price discounts. Verecchia (1983) shows why real-life disclosure is often 
non-complete by introducing proprietary costs, i.e. costs associated with increased levels of 
disclosure originating from the preparation and presentation efforts and the higher exposure to 
competitors. Hence, economic agents are typically not willing to disclose all information they 
hold since this generates proprietary costs. While outsiders do not know to what extent the 
withheld information represents good or bad news, the value of the firm typically is lowered 
to a threshold level whereby a manager is motivated to withhold a specified amount of 
information.  
A stream of empirical research focuses on the determinants of a firm’s voluntary 
disclosure decision and the associated economic benefits of increased disclosure. These 
economic benefits are often valorized by studying the relation between a firm’s cost of capital 
and its disclosure policy. To test this relation, researchers focus on various proxies for a 
firm’s cost of equity capital like bid-ask spreads (Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999), Leuz and 
Verecchia (2000)), stock liquidity (Botosan and Frost (1998), Leuz and Verecchia (2000)), 
share price variability (Leuz and Verecchia (2000)) and accounting-based valuations (Botosan 
(1997)). Botosan (1997) finds evidence that greater disclosure is associated with a lower cost 
of equity capital, but only for firms with low analyst following. Botosan and Frost (1998) find 
a positive association between stock liquidity and the timeliness of disclosure. Leuz and 
Verecchia (2000) show that German firms switching from German GAAP to IAS or US 
GAAP experience lower bid-ask spreads and higher trading volume but record no 
improvements with respect to share price variability. Sengupta (1998) analyzes a firm’s cost 
of debt capital in relation to disclosure and finds that firms with timely and clear disclosures 
are rewarded with a lower cost of borrowing.  
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Related studies use the context of equity offerings to investigate the interaction 
between a firm’s disclosure policy and its associated cost of capital. Schrand and Verecchia 
(2002) study disclosure policies around Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and find that greater 
disclosure frequency in the pre-IPO period is associated with lower underpricing. Marquardt 
and Wiedman (1998) find that prior to a Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO), firms often 
increase their disclosure level substantially to reduce information asymmetries inherent to the 
equity offering. Lang and Lundholm (2000) document that a consistently high disclosure 
strategy leads to a reduction of the information asymmetry inherent in the offering, whereas 
increased disclosure often is a result of an attempt to "hype the stock".  
Other studies focus more explicitly on the governance-related determinants of a firm’s 
disclosure behavior and analyze this behavior in an agency context where principals and 
agents have different objectives (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Managerial ownership is seen 
as an indication of the alignment of interests between principals and agents resulting in 
studies investigating the relation between a firm’s disclosure policy, its ownership structure 
and the corporate governance system in-place. Ruland, Tung and George (1990) find that 
ownership structure, measured as the percentage of voting stock owned by officers and 
directors, is by far the most important variable in explaining a firm's disclosure of earnings 
forecasts. Forker (1992) reports a positive association between the tightness of a firm’s 
corporate governance system and share option disclosures. Ho and Wong (2001) study Hong 
Kong listed firms and document that the existence of an audit committee is positively related 
to the extent of disclosure while the percentage of family members on the board has a 
negative impact on disclosure. Eng and Mak (2003) study firms listed on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange and find a positive association between government ownership and voluntary 
disclosure, while both the number of outside directors and managerial ownership influence 
disclosure behavior negatively. However, Raffournier (1995) does not find a specific relation 
between the disclosure policy of Swiss firms and their ownership structure. 
To our knowledge, no prior studies have explicitly considered the PE investment 
process and the associated disclosure policy of their portfolio companies. Gompers (1995), 
Lerner (1995) and Kaplan and Strömberg (2002) have studied the monitoring function of PE 
investors more in general. Others, like Hellmann and Puri (2002) focus on the supportive role 
of PE and find that PE is related to a number of professionalization measures like human 
resource policies, the adoption of stock option plans and hiring a marketing vice president. 
Mitchell, Reid and Terry (1995) show that PE investors have a substantial post-investment 
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demand for accounting information and that accounting profit targets are often used as 
safeguards in bonding arrangements. None of the aforementioned studies, however, measures 
to what extent the PE investment process impacts the portfolio firms financial reporting 
practice. We argue that applying for and receiving PE affects a firm’s business environment 
and study how the disclosure issue is related to this.  
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
PE is a financing alternative for entrepreneurial firms when traditional financing 
mechanisms like bank loans and other credits are difficult or even impossible to obtain. As 
such, PE has developed as an important intermediary in financial markets and is especially 
appropriate for the financing of firms where large information asymmetries and agency 
problems are present (Admati and Pfleiderer (1994), Gompers and Lerner (2001)).  In this 
section, we argue how both aforementioned issues are thought to impact the corporate 
disclosure behavior of portfolio firms in the years around the PE financing.  
 
Disclosure and Pre-Financing Information Asymmetries 
Anecdotal evidence and academic studies show that PE investors screen potential 
entrepreneurial companies extensively before deciding to invest in the company. Selection 
only takes place when a firm successfully passes an initial screening round and a more 
thorough due diligence process (Robbie and Wright (1998)). Although there are substantial 
differences across firm types, industry and geographic location there is anecdotal evidence 
that out of 100 proposals that are submitted to a PE investor per year, on average only ten 
pass the initial screening round and from these ten, only one or two actually receive PE 
financing (Berlin (1998)).  
Since information asymmetries and adverse selection problems clearly determine the 
probability of receiving PE financing, good entrepreneurs have an incentive to signal their 
high quality to outside PE investors. One option for entrepreneurs to signal their dedication is 
retaining a substantial equity stake in the venture firm (e.g. Leland and Pyle (1977)). This 
behavior mitigates the agency conflict by aligning the interests of entrepreneurs and outside 
investors. Other important criteria on which PE investors ground their investment decisions 
are viability and novelty of the project, financial profitability, skills and dedication of the 
entrepreneurial team and possibility for high returns at the exit time (Hall and Hofer (1993) 
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Fried and Hisrich (1994), Robbie and Wright (1998)). It is of paramount importance that 
entrepreneurs who want to attract PE score sufficiently high on most of these criteria to signal 
their high quality to potential investors.  
Evidence further shows that accounting information is a crucial issue which is 
required by PE investors before deciding to invest (Manigart et al. (2000), Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2004)). In general, professional investors rate accounting disclosure as the most 
important element which impacts their financing decision (McKinsey (2002)). Given that the 
use of accounting information and its disclosure extent is highly important in screening and 
selecting investment opportunities, we expect entrepreneurs to give more attention to it when 
applying for PE. Entrepreneurs can reduce information asymmetries inherent to the PE 
offering by disclosing more information than legally required to outside stakeholders. From 
an investor’s point of view, a high disclosure strategy is likely to be evaluated positively since 
this behavior not only indicates a high professionalism with respect to the in-house financial 
reporting process but also a readiness to disclose information after the PE investment has 
taken place. We therefore postulate that high quality firms switch to a higher disclosure level 
prior the PE investment in an attempt to reduce information asymmetries and to signal their 
superior quality. 
In the line of this reasoning, we postulate that a high disclosure strategy will initially 
facilitate the PE financing search through a reduction of the information asymmetry present in 
the first steps of the quest for PE. Entrepreneurial research generally agrees that PE investors 
have access to internal documents which generally contain substantially more information 
than the published annual report (e.g. Fried and Hisrich (1994), Robbie and Wright (1998)). 
At first sight, this would mean that increased disclosure would not have additional value to PE 
investors, since they have in-depth information which goes beyond the disclosure of financial 
information. However, we argue that entrepreneurial firms catch the attention of PE investors, 
amongst others, by increased disclosure levels. At the time entrepreneurs start their search for 
financing, PE investors do not yet posses the detailed information they typically ask for in the 
due diligence process. Hence, a high disclosure strategy is a valuable tool to reduce initial 
information asymmetries in the search for PE.   
 
Disclosure and Post-Financing Monitoring  
Whereas the pre-investment period is typically dominated by information asymmetries 
and adverse selection problems, the mutual relationship which arises between the 
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entrepreneur and its PE investor after the PE investment is subject to potential agency 
conflicts and moral hazard problems. There is substantial evidence that PE investors address 
agency conflicts by extensive monitoring ex post, which typically intensifies the portfolio 
companies’ corporate governance system in-place (e.g. Gompers (1995), Lerner (1995), 
Robbie and Wright (1998), Gompers and Lerner (2001), Kaplan and Strömberg (2002)). 
Hellmann and Puri (2002) go beyond this monitoring role of PE and find that PE investors 
play a supportive role in building the entrepreneurial firm.  
We argue that the intensified monitoring and professionalization originating from the 
PE investor will affect the disclosure policy of portfolio firms. Since PE investors play a role 
that goes beyond that of traditional financial intermediaries, it is likely that they guide and 
professionalize the financial reporting process. Since PE investors typically monitor their 
portfolio companies closely, they may contract deals with their portfolio firms stipulating that 
the financial reporting should comply with some minimum reporting criteria, like e.g. have a 
substantial amount of public disclosure. Further, portfolio companies also benefit from the 
financial expertise and in-house knowledge of the professional PE investor enabling them to 
report complete financial statements with a minimum of effort. Thus, professionalization is 
another factor which is expected to drive disclosure positively. Both arguments suggest that 
PE backed firms are likely to disclose more information than would be the case without PE 
involvement. As such, we postulate that from the PE investment onwards, PE investors’ 
involvement evokes a higher disclosure policy.  
Taking the aforementioned elements into account, we incline towards the argument 
that PE governance and portfolio firm’s disclosure are complements rather than substitutes. 
Consistent with the complementary argument of intensified corporate governance, we 
associate a greater extent of disclosure with additional PE monitoring since the adoption of 
more governance mechanisms strengthens the internal controls in order to minimize 
opportunistic behavior and information asymmetries (Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1981)). Alternatively, PE monitoring could also be a substitute for voluntary disclosure since 
higher monitoring influence could reduce the need for other governance mechanisms, such as 
higher disclosure levels. PE investors, however, are concerned about their perceived quality in 
the PE industry (Gompers and Lerner (2001)). Provided that PE quality is generally reflected 
by the quality of their portfolio companies, it is likely that PE investors use their monitoring 
power to implement a high disclosure policy in their portfolio companies. 
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Disclosure and Investor Type 
Different types of PE investors often generate different types of deals, particularly 
because both the professionalism of the screening and monitoring activities are determined by 
investor type (e.g. Lerner (1999), Leleux and Surlemont (2003)). Since a firm's disclosure 
behavior is likely to be associated with the extent and intensity of its screening and 
monitoring efforts, one can question whether the disclosure policy of PE portfolio companies 
is affected by its investor type. Especially, we are interested in disclosure policies of firms 
backed by government-related PE investors versus non-government-related PE investors.  
Managers of government-related PE investment companies are often labeled as civil 
servants and as such may not have the experience nor the motivation to select or support 
entrepreneurial companies (Manigart, Baeyens and Van Hyfte (2002), Leleux and Surlemont 
(2003)). Government-related PE investors' investment decisions are often driven more by a 
societal goal instead of a profit maximization standpoint (Lerner, 1999). Moreover, 
government-related PE investors have less pressure to earn a return on their investment, as 
they do not have to raise new funds from the market and may have other goals than value 
maximization for their shareholders (Gompers and Lerner (2001)). Further, the absence of 
performance-related incentive schemes in government-related PE investors create less 
incentives to monitor portfolio companies tightly compared to the profit-oriented incentive 
packages which are more commonly used in non-government PE investment firms (Leleux 
and Surlemont (2003)).  
Provided that government-related PE investors use less stringent screening devices 
before the PE investment, are weaker monitors ex post and have less professional in-house 
skills to support their portfolio companies, we expect lower disclosure in government-PE 
backed firms compared to non-government PE backed firms and this both in the pre- and 
post-investment stage. Prior to the PE investment, firms which focus on attracting government 
PE and are aware of the lower professionalism and other goals of these government PE firms 
have less incentives to disclose additional information on top of the regulatory minima.3 From 
an investor perspective, firms with low disclosure levels may reflect a lower professionalism 
and/or a lower willingness to share information to outside PE investors making it more 
difficult for them to raise capital from more stringent and selective non-government PE 
instances. In the post-investment period, we expect the weaker monitoring activities in-place 
to result in a lower disclosure policy for government-PE backed firms compared to their non-
government PE backed counterparts. 4 
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RESEARCH SETTING AND SAMPLE PROPERTIES 
To test the hypotheses, we use a unique hand-collected database containing financial 
statement information of Belgian companies that received PE financing between 1985 and 
1999. This dataset has two major advantages which make it particularly attractive to study the 
disclosure issue.  
First, all Belgian companies (both listed and non-listed) are obliged to deposit their 
financial statement annually at the National Bank of Belgium in accordance with Belgian 
Legislation. Hence, this dataset offers the opportunity to study the evolution in the disclosure 
behavior of unlisted firms which experience a clearly identifiable change in ownership and 
governance structure resulting from the PE investment. Such a dataset is typically not 
available in a classical research context like the US where detailed financial statement 
information of unlisted firms is not retrievable. Therefore, this dataset offers an excellent 
opportunity to study disclosure behavior of unlisted firms as a response to (i) increased 
scrutiny by outside PE investors before the investment date and (ii) a changing corporate 
governance and increased professionalization ex post. Although unlisted firms, on average, 
experience a lower demand for high quality financial accounting compared to listed firms and 
are less subject to public scrutiny, their disclosure decision may nevertheless be affected by 
the decision to raise PE financing and the change in governance and professionalization ex 
post.  
Second, the Belgian PE industry differs substantially from that in the US and the UK 
and even other Continental European countries since approximately half of all PE investments 
come from government-related PE firms (EVCA, various yearbooks). Hence, our specific 
dataset on Belgian PE deals may provide useful insights in whether differences in PE investor 
types and characteristics (i.e. government versus non-government related) affect the 
disclosure policy of their portfolio firms.  
 
The Belgian PE Industry 
Before the 1980s, Europe and the US were two different continents with respect to PE 
financing patterns. The absence of a supportive entrepreneurial spirit across Europe combined 
with poor exit alternatives offered by the stock market resulted in a substantial 
underdevelopment of the European PE industry compared to the US. The Belgian situation 
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was comparable to the one in Europe, where PE only gained importance after the 1980s. 
Evidence of this juvenile character of the Belgian PE industry is clearly illustrated when 
comparing the importance of the industry with respect to the size of the economy. During our 
observation period 1985-1999, average Belgian PE investments totaled 0.06% of GDP. US 
figures are substantially higher, reaching values of 3 to 4 times that size during the same 
period (Manigart, Baeyens and Van Hyfte (2002)). Consistent with worldwide tendencies, the 
Belgian PE industry grew sharply, especially during the late 1990’s bubble years to a 
maximum of 0.22% of GDP in 2000. Over the last two years, again following worldwide 
tendencies, total PE investments nearly halved to 0.12% of GDP in 2002 (EVCA, various 
yearbooks).  
During the observation period, the vast majority (58%) of Belgian PE funds was 
invested in the expansion stage. Seed and start-up investments, replacement capital and buy-
outs accounted for respectively 26%, 9% and 7%. The most popular investment sector was 
high-tech related (47%), according to EVCA definitions, “communications, computer and 
other electronics related, biotech and medical or health related”. Industrial-related and 
consumer-related sectors accounted for respectively 17% and 10% of all investments during 
that period. 
With respect to investor type, the Belgian PE industry is further characterized by a 
large number of small independent PE investors and a few large PE investment houses 
(EVCA, various years). It is noteworthy that more than half of all PE investments made 
during our observation period come from government-related PE investors. Both the Flemish 
GIMV (Gewestelijke InvesteringsMaatschappij voor Vlaanderen) and the Walloon SRIW 
(Société Régionale d’Investissement de Wallonie) account for a substantial part of these 
government-related PE investments. Independent and captive investors both account for a 
mere 25% of total investments.  
 
Reporting Requirements of Belgian Firms  
Belgian companies are obliged to file their financial statement annually in compliance 
with Belgian Legislation. In accordance with the Royal Decree of October 8, 1976, small and 
medium-sized firms are allowed to report an abbreviated (i.e. less detailed) financial 
statement whereas large firms are obliged to report a complete (i.e. more detailed) financial 
statement. One of the main advantages of reporting an abbreviated format is its confined 
preparation time and the fact that it allows firms to protect potentially sensitive information 
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from public scrutiny. Firms can only opt for the abbreviated format if they do not exceed two 
or more of the following criteria: (i) annual turnover < 6,250,000 euro, (ii) total assets < 
3,125,000 euro and (iii) average number of full time employees < 50. If a firm employs more 
than 100 full time employees on an annual basis it is automatically classified as a large firm, 
irrespective of its sales or total assets level.5 However, small or medium-sized firms are free 
to supply more information than legally required by reporting a complete, i.e. more detailed, 
financial statement on a voluntary basis.  
Complete financial statements differ from abbreviated statements in that they provide 
more detailed information on a number of financial statement items. With respect to the 
balance sheet, abbreviated formats provide less detail with respect to financial fixed assets, 
inventory and contracts in progress, investments and long term debt. The income statement 
also differs substantially since far less detail is provided on operating costs and expenses; 
these are summarized together with sales in a gross margin. Further, providing details on 
sales, purchases of raw materials, services and other goods is optional. Finally, accompanying 
notes to the financial statement are also restricted to a minimum for abbreviated formats.  
 
Disclosure Proxy 
The proxy used in the current study to measure a firm’s disclosure policy is a self-
constructed measure related to the disclosure of financial statement items. Firms which 
comply with the minimum requirements to file an abbreviated financial statement but which 
nevertheless decide to disclose a complete financial statement optionally are labeled as high-
disclosure firms. The motivation for using this disclosure proxy is that we analyze disclosure 
behavior of non-US based and unlisted firms. This restricts us from making use of standard 
disclosure measures like AIMR metrics or management forecasts. The metric used in this 
study is primarily related to the disclosure of financial statement information since alternative 
measures for disclosures like analyst meetings, conference calls and other professional venues 
are not applicable for this sample of unlisted firms. Although financial disclosure captures 
only one aspect of a firm’s total disclosure behavior, we are convinced that this disclosure 
metric is relevant for our research context. Financial statements are one of the most important 
means by which unlisted firms communicate their business to the outside stakeholders. 
Moreover, studying financial accounting disclosure is particularly interesting since evidence 
shows that accounting disclosure is by far the most important issue for professional investors 
to ground their investment decision. Finally, other metrics for firm disclosure as well as 
17 
management forecasts and AIMR disclosure scores have also been criticized in that they are 
evenly unable to capture a firm’s total willingness to disclose and are often biased (e.g. Healy 
and Palepu, 2001).  
Since abbreviated financial statements contain far less detail than complete financial 
statements, external parties are better informed about the firm’s underlying business activities 
and the competitive situation of complete financial statement disclosers. As a result, SME 
firms that are legally allowed to issue an abbreviated financial statement but which, 
nevertheless, decide to issue a complete financial statement opt to provide a substantial 
amount of extra information to outside stakeholders. In the vein of Verecchia’s (1983) 
arguments, we state that firms which report complete financial statements optionally, burden 
themselves with a substantial proprietary cost since they not only face higher preparation and 
presentation costs but also because they provide a substantially higher amount of firm details 
to outsiders which might harm their competitive position. Therefore, SME firms are thought 
to disclose complete financial statements based on the trade-off between the increase in 
proprietary costs and the intrinsic benefits inherent to this improved disclosure. Given that 
firms which are seeking for outside PE financing are typically cash constrained, we expect a 
higher willingness to disclose additional financial statement information, even if this 
disclosure is harmful for their competitive position.6 
A concern, often overlooked in disclosure studies, is whether the disclosure act is a 
commitment to a higher disclosure policy rather than an ad hoc decision to disclose, which 
might be reversed if a firm feels the need to do so (Diamond and Verecchia (1991), Leuz and 
Verecchia (2000)). A commitment to a higher disclosure level yields higher economic 
benefits than a conditional disclosure decision since a consistently high disclosure policy has 
more information content. A firm’s decision to disclose a complete financial statement 
generates switches in a firm’s accounting system but could be reversed at a later time. 
However, we are convinced that by adopting a more complex and elaborated financial 
reporting strategy, firms build substantial financial expertise and know-how which is not 
likely to be reversed. Consequently, we expect and also find that this switch to a higher 
disclosure strategy causes a change in the firm’s financial reporting attitude and 
professionalism and is a valuable proxy for a firm’s disclosure commitment. 7 
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DATA AND DESCRIPTIVES  
The Sample  
All analyses are run on a hand-collected database with financial and non-financial data 
of Belgian PE backed companies that received PE financing for the first time in their history 
over the period 1985 to 1999. Deals were identified by consulting PE investment reports and 
press releases, while financial statements of the sample firms were retrieved from the 
financial statement information database of the National Bank of Belgium and ‘Belfirst’®, a 
Bureau Van Dijk database. Next to the financial statements, we identified the PE investor 
identity and the exact date of the initial PE investment. To be included in this sample, 
portfolio companies have to be independent firms of which the financial statements are 
recorded on a regular basis in the database of the National Bank of Belgium. Further, 
financial and holding companies are excluded because of their highly specific nature and their 
industry-specific reporting requirements. This selection procedure results in a sample of 556 
PE backed firms, representing nearly 40% of all PE investments in Belgium over the observed 
period.  
To provide a basis for comparison, we selected a comparable sample of companies 
that did not receive PE, a method consistent with related studies in the field. Following 
Megginson and Weiss (1991), Jain and Kini (1995) and Lerner (1999), each PE backed 
company is matched as closely as possible with a non-PE backed independent firm on three 
criteria in the pre-investment year: (i) activity – measured by a two digit sector code –, (ii) 
size – proxied by total assets – and (iii) age.8 For firms which received PE funding in the 
start-up year, the matching year was set equal to the first year in which the financial statement 
data become available, typically being the investment year.  
We focus on a sample firms’ disclosure policies in the years around the PE financing 
event. These are the years of interest to study the effect of signaling, increased monitoring and 
changing professionalization on the portfolio firm’s disclosure policy. We therefore focus our 
analyses on a time window of 3 years before until 5 years after the PE financing year. Since 
not all firms have information available from (t-3), e.g. because they were not operational at 
that time, and not all firms report information until (t+5) since firms can go bankrupt or merge 
with another firm, the sample is an unbalanced panel with maximally 9 years of consecutive 
data for each firm.  
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To test our hypotheses, we concentrate on those firm-years in which firms comply 
with the requirements to report an abbreviated financial statement but are nevertheless free to 
provide a complete financial statement optionally. If a company discloses a complete 
financial statement although legally an abbreviated format is sufficient, it is labeled as a high 
disclosure firm since this firm is willing to carry the costs stemming from the increased 
disclosure in exchange for the alleged economic benefits. Hence, we leave out all firm-years 
from the initial dataset for which companies exceed the minimum requirements and 
consequently are legally obliged to report a complete financial statement, since these are not 
the focus of our research. This results in a substantial reduction in the number of observations 
in the analysis. E.g. in the year of PE financing, we find that approximately 33% of the 
initially identified PE firms exceed the legal requirements to report an abbreviated financial 
statement. Panel A of Table 1 shows a breakdown for the PE financing year on the number of 
available firm-observations in our PE backed and matched sample. Panel B additionally 
provides descriptive statistics on sample and matched firms’ in the PE financing year. 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
Table 1 shows a breakdown of the available firm-observations both for the PE backed 
and non-PE backed matched sample. We summarize the results of our search in the PE 
financing year in Panel A. From the initially detected PE backed and matched sample, we 
have financial statement information of 876 firms (438 PE backed and 438 non-PE backed 
matched firms).9 Missing variables with respect to one or more of the reported minimum 
criteria limits us to 745 firms for which we can calculate whether a firm is allowed to report 
an abbreviated financial statement or whether firms are legally obliged to report a complete 
financial statement. Of these 745 firms, 336 are PE backed and 409 are non-PE backed. For 
302 firms (146 PE backed and 156 non-PE backed), firm characteristics exceed two or more 
of the minimum requirements in the year of interest. Hence, these firms are obliged to report a 
complete financial statement, which makes that only 443 firms (190 PE backed and 253 non-
PE backed) are, according to the law, allowed to report an abbreviated format. We focus our 
analyses on these firm observations since these are the firms that have the option to freely 
commit to a higher disclosure policy. We have calculated and computed the number of 
available observations in each firm-year in an identical way, leading to a variable number of 
observations across all years, in each sample.  
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Panel B shows that in the year of PE-financing, sample and control firms are on 
average 9.60 years old, whereas the median age is 6.00 years. Mean (median) total assets are 
1,557,752 (1,014,479) EUR. Top three sectors are (1) computer related services (22.3%), (2) 
wholesale distribution (19.4%) and (3) building services (7.7%). Testing the differences in 
means (medians) between both the PE backed and the non-PE backed sample shows that in 
the year of PE financing, both sets are similar with respect to age and sector distribution but 
that PE backed firms are on average larger than non-PE backed firms.10 Moreover, we find 
that the mean leverage is 67.6% and does not differ significantly between PE backed and 
matched firms. By contrast, PE backed firms are less profitable and have more fixed assets at 
their disposal than non-PE backed matched firms, and this both in a significant way. 
 
Variable Selection 
In what follows, we describe the variables used in the analyses and the way they are 
defined and collated. We identify variables that are related to the PE investment and its 
associated change in corporate governance next to additional firm-specific determinants of 
corporate disclosures which are often identified in the extant literature. The variable of 
interest, HIGHDISC, is a binary variable taking a value of 1 when a firm discloses a complete 
financial statement although legally an abbreviated format is sufficient. PE is a binary 
variable taking the value of one if a firm receives PE and is activated both in the pre- and 
post-investment years. PEpost is an interaction variable which is equal to one for PE backed 
firms, but only from the moment the firm receives PE financing and is zero otherwise. This 
variable measures the additional impact of PE investor’s monitoring pressure on the firm’s 
compliance to disclose complete financial statements. PEyear–3 and PEyear–2 are interaction 
variables used in the multivariate analyses. These variables are activated for PE backed firms 
three and two years prior to PE financing, respectively. Combinations of the interaction 
variables PE, PEyear–3, PEyear–2 and PEpost allows to disentangle the differences in firms’ 
willingness to disclose, both in the pre- and post-investment years, dependent on the 
incidence of being PE backed. GOVERNMENT is a dummy variable that is activated when a 
PE portfolio firm is backed by a government-related instance. We multiply this variable with 
PE and PEpost to measure differences in firms’ disclosure policy – again both in the pre- and 
post PE financing period – depending on PE investor type (i.e. government versus non-
government related PE investors). All the aforementioned variables allow us to untie the 
impact of (i) the entrepreneurial attempts to catch potential PE investors’ attention by means 
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of increased public disclosure in the pre-financing period and (ii) the monitoring and 
professionalization effect PE investors have on their portfolio firms’ disclosure policy once 
these have invested.  
We further incorporate firm-specific variables, previously identified as determinants 
of corporate disclosure behavior. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s age and is 
expected to be negatively related to a firm’s decision to disclose (Raffournier (1995), Ho and 
Wong (2001)) since information asymmetries are typically higher in younger firms and might 
call for a higher disclosure extent. LEVERAGE is defined as (Total Liabilities/Total Assets) 
and quantifies a firm’s solvency situation: a high leverage corresponds to having larger 
volumes of outstanding liabilities. High leverage levels are expected to substitute the need for 
additional disclosure since leverage helps controlling the free cash flow problem and the 
agency costs of debt are typically controlled through restrictive debt covenants rather than 
increased disclosure of information in annual reports (Jensen (1986)). FIXASSETS measures 
the proportion of a firm’s fixed assets to total assets. Consistent with previous studies 
(Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981), Ho and Wong (2001)), we expect FIXASSETS to 
be negatively related to the voluntary disclosure proxy. A higher proportion of fixed assets is 
associated with less information asymmetry and consequently with a lower risk profile. 
XORDINC is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when a firm’s extraordinary income is 
higher than 25% of its current income level. Firms with a high extraordinary component in 
reported income are associated with more uncertainty calling for a positive association 
between XORDINC and HIGHDISC. Moreover, extraordinary items often impact the balance 
sheet and as such might also require a more detailed balance sheet (Chen, DeFond and Park 
(2002)). 11 Finally, LOSS is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when a firm reports a 
loss. Loss-making firms are potentially more risky than profitable firms and are as such 
potentially more compelled to disclose complete financial statements above the regulatory 
minima. Table 2 summarizes the definition and measurement of all variables used in the 
analyses and their expected relation with our disclosure variable. 12 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
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ANALYSES  
Univariate Results 
Table 3 shows a breakdown of the total number of firm observations available in each 
year around the PE financing event as well as the absolute and relative number of high 
disclosure firm-year observations. The proportional evolution of high disclosure firms within 
the PE backed sample and the matched sample is further illustrated in Figure 1. 
Insert Table 3 and Figure 1 About Here 
The number of available firm-year observations varies between a minimum of 128 
(115) and a maximum of 285 (234) in the non-PE backed sample (PE backed sample). The 
total number of observations increases over time and reaches a maximum two years after the 
PE financing in both subsamples. This is due to the average age of the analyzed firms: a 
breakdown of the sample firms’ age shows that about one third of the firms are younger than 
2 years at the time of PE financing leading to an underrepresentation of firm-years in the pre-
PE financing years compared to post-years.  
In the non-PE backed sample, the average number of high disclosers remains constant 
over the observation period, exactly as we expected. On average, 14.9% of all non-PE backed 
firms disclose more information than legally required. By contrast the mean proportion of 
high disclosure firms in the PE backed sample is 27.6% and is significantly higher (χ²=5.99) 
than the percentage within the non-PE backed sample. For the PE sample firms, the average 
percentage of high disclosers in the period before the PE financing date differs significantly 
(χ²=4.41) from the percentage in the post-financing period: 17.3% versus 31.3%.  
The proportional differences per year across both samples show interesting patterns. 
Whereas the percentage of high disclosures for PE backed firms rises from 15.7% in (t-3) 
over 23.7% in the year of PE financing to a maximum of 36.6% in year (t+5), the proportion 
in the non-PE sample remains fairly stable around its mean level (14.9%). Univariate test 
statistics show that the average proportion of high disclosers is significantly higher for the PE 
backed subsample than for the matched sample one year before the PE financing (at the 90% 
confidence level) and intensifies further from the PE financing year onwards. These univariate 
results indicate that (i) PE backed firms switch to a higher disclosure level in the pre-PE 
financing year and (ii) PE investors’ involvement further impacts the disclosure policy of 
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their portfolio companies positively. Conditioning the sample for government versus non-
government PE backed portfolio firms shows no significant differences, suggesting no 
systematic impact of investor type on PE investors’ disclosure policy at this level.13  
However, these findings have to be interpreted with the necessary caution because 
they do not control for differences in firm characteristics. Table 4 shows descriptive statistics 
for the variables of interest in our total sample. Panel A reports cross-tables and χ²-statistics 
for high and low disclosure firms differentiating on (i) being PE backed, (ii) reporting a 
substantial extraordinary income (above 25% of current profit) and (iii) reporting a loss. In 
contrast to our expectations, high disclosure firms are proportionally underrepresented in the 
sample with high levels of extraordinary income. Differentiating for firms reporting losses 
versus profits does not yield significantly different patterns between the high and low 
disclosure subsample.  
Panel B provides descriptive statistics on the continuous variables of interest and t-test 
and Mann-Whitney test statistics indicating the difference in means (medians) between high 
disclosure versus low disclosure firms. Results show that younger firms tend to disclose more, 
a finding in line with the postulation that younger firms are more risky and as such are more 
inclined to reduce information asymmetry problems by increased disclosure. Further, high 
disclosure firms have a significantly lower leverage compared to low disclosure firms, a 
finding consistent with the Jensen-type (1986) argument. We do not find significant 
differences in fixed assets between high and low disclosure firms.  
Finally, Panel C of Table 3 presents Pearson and Spearman correlations between the 
variable of interest (HIGHDISC) and the continuous explanatory variables. All relations 
between HIGHDISC and the other variables are in line with the above results. Further, 
correlations between the independent variables are often significant but fairly small and 
suggest no collinearity problems in the multivariate analyses.  
Insert Table 4 About Here 
 
Disclosure Model and Multivariate Results 
In this section, we apply pooled panel logit regressions to examine the dynamic 
relationship between a firm’s disclosure policy, the change in corporate governance and 
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professionalism driven by PE investors’ presence, together with other firm-specific 
characteristics. To digress briefly on this methodology, panel data techniques combine cross-
sectional and time-series characteristics in an optimal model and control for individual 
heterogeneity across firms, collinearity among the variables and firms dynamics over time 
(Baltagi (2001)). Further, panel data analyses allow to capture firms’ economics of adjustment 
to a specific state – here: disclosure policy – and suffer less from biases resulting from 
aggregation (Greene (1997), Baltagi (2001)). Given the binary structure of our dependent 
variable, a panel logit is the most appropriate method of analysis.  
We model a firm’s decisions to disclose as a function of receiving PE, both in the pre- 
and post-financing years, together with other cross-sectional determinants identified in the 
extant disclosure literature and also described above. Our initial panel logit model has the 
following form:  
 
HIGHDISCit = α + β1it.PE + β2it.PEpost + γ’it .CONTROL VARIABLES + Uit 
 
We model to what extent a firm’s decision to disclose complete financial statements is 
related to receiving PE financing and condition our analyses for pre-financing years (β1) and 
post-financing years (β1 + β2). Further, we incorporate control variables which we described 
above (Table 2). Results of this panel logit are reported in the first column of Table 5. 
Insert Table 5 About Here 
Results show clear evidence in line with the findings of the bivariate analyses. In the 
pre-financing years, PE backed firms have a significantly higher probability of being a high 
disclosure firm (β1 = 1.24). This probability increases strongly from the PE financing year 
onwards as β2 = 2.28, leading to a compound coefficient in the post-PE financing years 
compared to non-PE backed firm-years of 3.52. These coefficients indicate that, prior to the 
PE financing, PE backed firms have about 21% higher likelihood of being a high disclosure 
firm compared to non-PE backed matches, and an additional 67% increase in probability once 
the PE financing has taken place. 14 Further, we find that both younger firms and low-leverage 
firms have a higher probability of being in the high disclosure sample. Both findings are in 
line with our expectations and the bivariate results. None of the other control variables are 
significant. 
(1
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Since we are particularly interested in the difference in disclosure policy between PE 
backed and non-PE backed firms very close to the PE-financing date, we additionally 
incorporate two year dummies (PEyear–3 and PEyear–2) in our model. Including these dummies 
allows to distinguish differences in disclosure behavior between PE backed and non-PE 
backed firms one year before the PE financing compared to earlier pre-financing years and 
compared to post-financing years. Model (2) shows this relation: 
 
HIGHDISCit = α + β1it.PE + β2it.PEyear–3 + β3it.PEyear–2 + β4it.PEpost + γ’it .CONTROL 
VARIABLES + Uit 
 
The results of the second column of Table 4 show the significantly higher tendency to 
report complete financial statements one year prior to the PE financing (β1 = 1.92). We find 
no relation between a firm’s disclosure policy and being three or two years before its PE 
financing date: as well (β1 + β2) and (β1 + β3) are insignificantly different from zero. Further, 
the additional disclosure effect for PE backed firms in the post-financing years remains high 
and significant (β4 = 1.60). With respect to the control variables, all coefficients and 
significance levels are similar to those of the first model. 
Results of both models provide clear evidence in line with our expectations. PE 
backed firms switch to a higher disclosure policy in the pre-financing year and we interpret 
this behavior as an attempt to reduce information asymmetries inherent to this PE application. 
Moreover, we find multivariate evidence that the likelihood to provide complete financial 
statements is even higher from the moment PE investors have invested in the portfolio firm. 
This finding is a clear indication that the intensified corporate governance and increased 
professionalization resulting from the PE investors’ presence has a complementary effect on 
the supply of the accounting disclosure of their portfolio firms.  
In a third model, we sort out differences in disclosure policy by conditioning the data 
on investor type (government versus non-government PE backed) after controlling for 
intrinsic company characteristics. To retrieve potential differences between firms backed by 
different investor types, we extend model (1) by adding two dummy variables. Both 
interaction variables control for government relations. The first dummy is activated when a 
firm is backed by a government-related PE provider, both in the pre- and post-financing 
period (= Government_PE). The second dummy is activated from the moment a firm receives 
government-related PE onwards (= Government_PEpost), and is zero otherwise. Incorporating 
(2
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these additional dummies allows to disentangle the incremental effects of investor types 
(government versus non-government related) on their portfolio firm’s disclosure policy, 
conditioning for different subperiods. Again, we incorporate the same control variables as 
above: 
 
HIGHDISCit = α + β1it.PE + β2it.PEpost + β3it.Government_PE + β4it.Government_PEpost +  
γ’it .CONTROL VARIABLES + Uit 
 
Column 3 of Table 5 shows a significantly positive effect on disclosure in the pre-PE 
financing period within the government PE backed firms (β3 = 2.75) which is not present in 
the non-government PE backed sample. Although this shows that government PE backed 
firms disclose more in the pre-financing years compared to non-government PE backed firms, 
the difference in disclosure post PE financing date between both samples is not significantly 
different from zero. The combined effect of (β3 + β4) shows that, after the PE financing date, 
the total difference in disclosure extent between government and non-government PE backed 
firms is not significantly different from zero. This suggests that investor type has no overall 
impact on their portfolio companies’ disclosure policy ex post. Hence, these multivariate 
findings do not corroborate our postulation that a PE portfolio firm’s disclosure policy is 
related to the characteristics of the investor type. By contrast, it suggests that entrepreneurs 
trace different PE investor parties and do not adjust their disclosure policy in function of the 
investor type. As such, we find that for this sample of unlisted PE backed firms, the well-
documented difference in governance and professionalization between PE investors has no 
sizeable effects on the way financial statement disclosure of their portfolio companies is 
enforced.   
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
In subsequent sensitivity analyses, we additionally control for elements which could – 
at least partially – drive our results. Since both the number of observations and some 
characteristics of PE backed and control firms differ after selection of firm-years where firms 
are free to report an abbreviated financial statement could make us concerned about the 
comparability of these samples. We therefore dealt with this matching issue in more detail 
and identified a perfect match sample where firm-year observations were only included in the 
analysis if each firm has a matched observation available for the same firm-year of the control 
(3
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sample. This more stringent matching method has the advantage that there is a matched 
equivalent available for each PE backed firm in the control sample and gives more confidence 
about the comparability of the observations across both samples over different firm-years. 
The analyses were rerun for this perfect matched sample and all patterns and results remain 
qualitatively equal. 15 
Additionally, we controlled for the inevitable endogeneity problem that is encountered 
when comparing PE backed firms with a set of matched firms. Although PE backed firms and 
their counterparts are matched as closely as possible in the pre-financing year (or the 
financing year if the company receives PE in the start up year), PE backed firms could still 
differ substantially from the matched firms due to intrinsic characteristics that are not 
controlled for in the analysis which might drive our findings. This endogeneity problem is 
often encountered in disclosure studies and is typically addressed by running two-stage 
equation models which take into account this kind of self-selection. We run two yearly logits 
for both the pre-financing and the financing year in which we specify the disclosure policy as 
a function of being PE backed and the same firm-specific characteristics used in the pooled 
panel logits. Focusing on these two years is important because these are the years where 
matching took place, which make them prone to potential uncontrolled selection bias.  
In a next step, we estimate two-stage Heckman corrected logit models for these firm-
years and compare the regression coefficients. In the two-stage logits, we first model the 
decision to attract PE as a function of a company’s (asset and gross margin) growth, 
investment intensity, profitability and the total amount of free cash available. All the 
aforementioned variables could differ potentially between the both samples and as such might 
disturb the findings when we do not control for them. In a second step, these intrinsic 
differences between PE backed and non-PE backed firms are integrated in our initial 
estimation model to capture the effect of being PE backed. Results are discussed in more 
detail in Appendix 1 and show that controlling for the aforementioned firm characteristics 
which are not captured by the matching criteria, does not yield different results than for the 
uncontrolled yearly logits. These findings comfort us that our results are not substantially 
biased by the endogeneity present in our sample.  
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION  
Analytical disclosure studies present several arguments why a firm’s disclosure policy 
and its corporate governance system in-place are thought to be related. Empirical studies, 
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however, often show mixed results most likely since both corporate governance and 
disclosure are measured by noisy proxies. The current study tries to overcome these 
shortcomings by studying corporate disclosure policies in a specific setting, namely around 
the private equity (PE) financing event. Studying a firm’s disclosure policy in relation to PE 
financing has the advantage that we do not have to rely on noisy proxies for changes in 
corporate governance structure since the analyzed firms experience an indisputable and 
perfectly identifiable change in their corporate environment. As such, this study not only 
complements accounting research by analyzing determinants of a firm’s disclosure policy in 
relation with a changing corporate governance system in-place but also entrepreneurial 
finance research since this often treats the corporate reporting environment as exogenous. 
More specifically, this study analyzes the disclosure policy of companies financed by 
PE investors, both before and after the PE investment, and compares it with the disclosure 
policy of matched non-PE backed firms. The disclosure policy is defined as the choice 
whether or not to disclose complete financial statements (which contain more details on sales 
levels and costs structures, amongst others) rather than abbreviated financial statements when 
possible. Reporting complete financial statements burdens a company with substantial 
proprietary costs inherent to the increased disclosure, making this a suitable proxy to measure 
unlisted firms’ disclosure behavior. Analyses are run on a unique hand-collected sample of 
Belgian unlisted, PE backed firms in the years around the PE financing event. The specific 
legal environment and PE industry characteristics in Belgium make it particularly suitable to 
conduct this study. All Belgian firms, both listed and unlisted, have to report financial 
statements. This creates a possibility to study the impact of changes in ownership structure, 
corporate governance and professionalization patterns resulting from the PE investment on a 
firm’s disclosure policy even when this firm is not listed on a stock exchange. Moreover, 
since about half of all PE investments come from public PE investment funds, these data shed 
more light on the impact of investor type on disclosure policies of portfolio firms. Studying 
the disclosure behavior longitudinally overcomes the often ignored feature that disclosure 
depends on a firm’s changing environment or economics.  
We find clear evidence that firms switch to a higher disclosure policy one year before 
they receive PE. This increase in disclosure is interpreted as an entrepreneurial attempt to 
reduce the information asymmetries inherent to the PE application. The commitment to this 
high disclosure is further intensified from the PE investment date onwards, suggesting a 
governance and professionalization impact of PE investors on their portfolio firm’s financial 
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reporting behavior. Conditioning the sample on differences in investor type shows that, after 
the PE financing date, portfolio firms’ disclosure behavior does not differ systematically 
between government PE backed and non-government PE backed firms. However, government 
PE backed firms do show an earlier switch to a higher disclosure level. This finding might be 
attributed to a longer search-for-equity period for these firms. Firms that receive government-
related PE financing could initially have tried to attract non-government PE investors hereby 
providing more financial disclosure, but in the end failed to do so. In a later stage, these firms 
might have to resort to lower quality PE investors, typically being the government-related 
instances. However, the rather low number of observations prior to the PE finance for the 
non-government backed firms makes it hard to provide sound proof for this argument and 
needs to be corroborated by further research. Our results are robust for a number of additional 
sensitivity checks, including the endogeneity problem present in our sample. In general, the 
evidence is consistent with the conjecture that there exists a clear link between a firm’s 
disclosure behavior and its changing corporate environment caused by the PE investment.  
Our findings might, nevertheless, be subject to some caveats. We do not have specific 
information on the (stipulations in) contracts between the firms and their PE investors nor 
with other external parties like banks and creditors. As such, existing (debt) contracts could 
contain explicit stipulations about financial reporting policies, making the analyzed disclosure 
behavior less discretionary than a priori assumed. By dissecting these contracts, one could 
discern more precisely to what extent the increased disclosure is a consequence of the 
increased monitoring or rather a pure professionalization outcome. Additionally, the dataset 
contains only firms that applied for and actually received PE financing. As such, potential 
control sample firms could be PE applicants that were unable to attract it. We do not see this 
as a big issue since it could only underestimate our results making the current relations even 
stronger than they are now. We encourage other researchers to examine other institutional 
settings and to relate the disclosure behavior to contractual stipulations. This could shed more 
light on the interrelationship between PE monitoring and professionalization impulses on a 
portfolio firm’s disclosure policy.  
These results have important implications for several economic parties. Entrepreneurs 
can learn from this that financial disclosure is an important issue in PE screening and 
governance. Increased governance resulting from PE investor involvement and synergies 
coming from PE in-house skills make portfolio firms more likely to commit to a high 
disclosure strategy. Further, these results are also important for other stakeholders of PE 
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backed companies like banks, competitors, employees or suppliers that actively make use of 
PE firm financial statements. PE investors affect the professionalization of their portfolio 
firms’ financial reporting in that they contribute to a higher disclosure, making financial 
statements substantially more informative for external stakeholders. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Year-Logits and Two-Stage Treatment Logits in Pre-Financing and Financing Year  
         Year
–1 Year0 Dependent = 
Disclosure (1, 
0) 
Test Logit Treatment Logit Test Logit Treatment Logit 
Variable Coeff z Coeff z Coeff z Coeff z 
PE 0.574 2.00† – – 0.684 2.59† – – 
LNAGE 0.040 0.20† 0.058 0.57† –0.195 –1.18† 0.213 1.53† 
FIXASSETS –0.501 –0.90† –0.287 –0.86† 0.545 1.14† 0.668 1.46† 
LEVERAGE –0.994 –1.81* –1.019 –1.85* –1.025 –2.09† –0.659 –1.87* 
XORDINC –0.114 –0.28† –0.126 –0.68† –0.691 –1.40† –0.824 –1.20† 
LOSS 0.149 0.49† 0.002 0.02† –0.079 –0.29† 0.028 0.13† 
Constant –1.194 –1.73* –0.907 –2.49† –1.131 –2.05† –0.765 –1.09† 
ρ(Test, Treatment)                                             –0.909 –0.06† 
Wald test of ρ=0                                                    2.47 0.04† 
No. of observations                        360†  442† 416† 
    
  Selection Logit  Selection Logit 
Dependent = PE (1,0)  (Year–1)  (Year0) 
   Coeff z†   Coeff z† 
∆ (Total Assets) –0.000 –0.01†   0.458 3.70‡ 
Investments/TA 0.005 0.01†   0.907 1.78† 
∆ (Gross Margin) 
 
–0.033 –1.45†   0.030 2.84‡ 
Accumulated Profit/TA –1.863 –3.26‡   –2.384 –2.38† 
Cash Reserves/TA –1.954 –2.08†   –1.794 –2.47† 
Constant   0.103 1.14†   –0.265 –2.68‡ 
         
 
This table presents the results of two yearly cross-sectional logits, one in the pre-
financing year (t–1) and one in the year of PE financing (t0). The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if a firm discloses a complete financial statement and 
zero otherwise. These yearly cross-sectional logit regressions show the relations between the 
decision to disclose complete financial statements and the propensity of being PE backed 
together with firm-specific variables in both matching years. Although PE backed firms and 
their counterparts are matched as closely as possible by size, age and sector industry in the 
pre-financing year (or the financing year if the company receives PE in the start up year), PE 
backed firms could still differ substantially from the matched firms due to intrinsic 
characteristics that are not controlled for in the uni- and multivariate analyses and might drive 
our findings.  
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We address this potential endogeneity problem by additionally running two-equation 
models which take into account this kind of self-selection. If the correlation between the error 
terms of the uncorrected logit (Test Logit) and the two-stage logit (Treatment Logit) is low, 
we can be confident that our uncorrected model is not harmed by potential endogeneity 
present in the sample. In this two-step Treatment Logit, we first model the PE application as a 
function of a firm’s (i) ∆ (Total Assets): (year-on-year asset growth, relative to last year’s 
assets), (ii) Investments intensity (investment in tangible and intangible assets as a percentage 
of total assets), ∆ (Gross margin) (= year-on-year change in gross margin, being a proxy for 
sales levels, as a fraction of last year’s gross margin figure), Accumulated profits (profits 
accumulated into retained earnings, expressed as a fraction of last year’s assets) and the extent 
of Cash reserves (year-end cash situation as a percentage of last year’s total assets). These 
specific variables are used in our selection model, since anecdotal and empirical evidence 
shows that these variables well capture uncontrolled differences in PE backed and non-PE 
backed firms. Robbie and Wright (1998) and Gompers and Lerner (2001), amongst others, 
report that PE backed firms typically have a higher growth pattern and investment (needs), are 
less profitable and are most often cash constrained.  
In a second step, these intrinsic differences between PE backed and non-PE backed 
firms are integrated in our initial estimation model to capture the effect of being PE backed. 
Wald χ² statistics indicate that both in the pre-financing year and the financing year itself the 
error terms between the uncorrected (Test) Logit and the Treatment Logit, controlling for 
endogeneity, are unrelated. This evidence suggests that although self-selection is present in 
our sample, it is not driving our results substantially. The coefficients of most control 
variables, however, are rather insignificant. We are not concerned about this finding since we 
loose a substantial amount of information by running these logits on a yearly basis instead of 
using the entire panel. The main reason for running these logits is to control for self-selection 
bias. Note that the number of observations in the Treatment Logits are lower than in the Test 
Logits due to missing data with respect to the additional variables needed to calculate the 
Selection Logits. Note that *  = significant at the 10% confidence level, † = significant at the 
5% confidence level, ‡ = significant at the 1% confidence level. 
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 TABLE 1 
Breakdown of Available Observations (Panel A) and Descriptives of Variables of 
Interest in the PE Financing Year (Panel B) 
Panel A (a) 
 
 All) PE backed Non-PE backed 
Number of firm-observations for which financial 
statement data are available 876) 438) 438) 
– Firm-observations with missing information on 
 one or more of the criteria (131) (102) (29) 
    
= 745) 336) 409) 
– Firm-observations which exceed regulatory 
 minima (302) (146) (156) 
    
=   Firm-observations of interest 443) 190) 253) 
    
Panel B (b)    
    
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Stdev. N 
Age       
All 
 9.59‡  6.00‡  0.00 91.00 10.9 443 
 PE  
 9.90‡  6.00‡  0.00 71.00 10.8 190 
Non-PE 
 9.36‡  5.00‡  0.00 91.00 11.0 253 
       
Total Assets (EUR)       
All 1,557,752‡  1,014,479‡  24,021 23,472,443 2,107,599 443 
 PE  1,884,893‡  1,346,062‡  26,549 18,089,262 2,054,792 190 
Non-PE 1,312,073‡  797,201‡  24,021 23,472,443 2,117,349 253 
       
Fixed Assets (%)       
All 37.20† 34.04‡  0.00 98.83 27.01 443 
 PE  40.23‡  39.79‡  0.00 97.46 25.52 190 
Non-PE 34.97‡  27.23‡  0.00 98.83 28.01 253 
       
Leverage (%)       
All 67.64‡  71.70‡  0.51 263.42 28.01 443 
 PE  68.95‡  71.83‡  0.51 263.42 27.98 190 
Non-PE 66.48‡  71.53‡  1.32 201.13 28.00 253 
       
Return on Assets (%)       
All –0.82‡  0.74‡  –174.95 109.82 17.43 443 
 PE  –4.28‡  0.19‡  –174.95 109.82 22.33 190 
Non-PE 1.78‡  1.52‡  –63.28 54.21 11.87 253 
 
Top 3 Sectors 
 
(1) Computer Services:                22.3 % 
(2) Wholesale Distribution:         19.4 % 
(3) Construction Sector:                 7.7 % 
 
(a) Panel A of Table 1 gives a breakdown of the number of available firm-observations both for the PE backed and non-PE 
backed matched sample in the PE financing year.  
(b) Panel B provides descriptive statistics on some characteristics of our PE backed and matched sample firms, as well as 
differences in means (medians) between both samples. Age is the number of years since the firm has been set up. Total assets 
is the absolute amount of total assets outstanding at the fiscal year-end, expressed in Euro (EUR). Fixed Assets is the relative 
proportion of fixed assets to total assets. Leverage is the proportion of a firm’s Total Liabilities to Total Assets. Return on 
Assets refers to the profitability of the sample firms and equals a firm’s fiscal earnings divided by total assets. Top 3 sectors 
refer to the 2-digit activity codes that are represented most in our sample. Asterisks mean that the means (medians) of the two 
groups are significantly different using a two-tailed t-test (Mann-Whitney U test), * : p < 0.10, † : p < 0.05, ‡ : p < 0.01. 
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TABLE 2 
Definition, measurement and expected sign of variables of interest (a) 
Variable Definition Measurement 
Expected 
Sign  
 
   
HIGHDISC Voluntary Disclosure Dummy 
Binary variable, taking the value of 1 
when a firm reports a complete 
financial statement although legally an 
abbreviated format is sufficient 
/ 
PE Private Equity Dummy 
Dummy variable, taking the value of 1 
when a firm is PE backed; this 
dummy is activated both in the pre- 
and post-investment years  
+ 
PEpost 
PE * Post-investment 
dummy 
Dummy variable, taking the value of 1 
from the moment a firm is PE backed, 
0 otherwise  
+ 
PEyear–3 PE * Year–3 Dummy variable, activated three years before the PE financing date – 
PEyear–2 PE * Year–2 Dummy variable, activated two years before the PE financing date – 
GOVERNMENT Government dummy 
Interaction variable; captures 
the effect of investor type on a 
firm’s disclosure policy. 1 = 
Government Backed, 0 = Non-
Government Backed 
– 
LNAGE Age variable 
Natural logarithm of the 
number of years since 
foundation 
– 
LEVERAGE Leverage (Total Liabilities/Total Assets): 
controls for a firm’s debt obligation – 
FIXASSETS Fixed Assets in Place Firms’ fixed assets as a proportion of total assets – 
XORDINC Extra-ordinary items dummy 
Dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 when extra-ordinary 
income exceeds 25% of current 
profit 
+ 
LOSS Loss Dummy 
Binary variable taking the value 
of 1 when a firm reports a loss 
before taxes, zero otherwise 
+ 
 
(a)
 This table gives an overview of all variables of interest analyzed in the univariate and multivariate analyses. The dependent 
variable HIGHDISC is analyzed as a function of pre- and post-PE financing variables to capture the willingness of firms that 
apply for and receive PE financing to disclose a complete financial statement, both in the pre- and post-PE financing years. 
Additionally, GOVERNMENT is a dummy variable which is activated if the PE investor is a government-related firm. 
LNAGE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s age and controls for uncertainty and information-asymmetry problems. 
LEVERAGE measures the amount of a firm’s Total Liabilities to Total Assets. FIXASSETS is the proportion of Fixed 
Assets to Total Assets and is expected to be negatively related to a firm’s disclosure behavior. Further, XORDINC (a dummy 
variable activated when a firm reports an extraordinary income above 25% of its current profit) and LOSS (a dummy variable 
activated when a firm reports a loss) are two additional controls for the inherent risks of a firm.  
 TABLE 3 
Evolution of High Disclosure Firms Per Subsample: 
 ([1] Non-PE Backed versus PE Backed and [2] Government versus Non-Government PE Backed) (a) 
 
NON-PE BACKED  PE BACKED  GOVERNMENT PE BACKED  
χ²
 
χ²
 
Year N 
all 
N
Highdisc
% 
Highdisc 
N
all
N
Highdisc
% 
Highdisc 
N
all
N
Highdisc
% 
Highdisc 
PE versus
nonPE
 GovPE versus 
Non-GovPE
  
–3 128 20 15.6% 115 18 15.7% 78 14 17.9% 0.00• 0.72
–2 146 20 13.7% 143 24 16.8% 94 19 20.2% 0.39• 1.69
–1 202 27 13.4% 174 35 20.1% 122 23 18.9% 2.21* 0.26
0 253 33 13.0% 190 45 23.4% 134 28 20.9% 5.87‡ 0.48
1 281 42 14.9% 218 66 30.3% 154 44 28.6% 10.83‡ 0.38
2 285 42 14.7% 234 76 32.5% 173 56 32.4% 14.37‡ 0.00
3 258 43 16.7% 212 70 33.0% 158 51 32.3% 10.35‡ 0.07
4 206 33 16.0% 161 54 33.5% 116 41 35.3% 9.34‡ 0.31
5 16 27 16.3% 123 45 36.6% 87 34 39.1% 9.07‡ 0.38
Sum 1,924 287 1,570 433 1,116 310  
Mean (t–3; t+5) 214 32 14.9% 174 48 27.6% 124 34 27.8% 
Mean (t–3; t–1) 159 22 14.1% 144 26 17.8% 98 19 19.0% 
Mean  (t0; t+5) 241 37 15.2% 190 59 31.3% 137 42 30.9% 
 
(a)
 Table 3 reports descriptive evolutions (total number as well as relative percentage) of the total number of firm-year observations for respectively the non-PE backed, PE backed subsample 
and the government-PE backed subsample. In order to test our hypotheses we focus on those firm-years in which firms comply with the regulatory minima to report an abbreviated financial 
statement. This additional condition yields an unequal number of firm-year observations across both samples. The focus of our analyses is, however, on those firms that meet the minimum 
requirements and hence have the choice to report a standard (abbreviated) format or a more detailed (complete) financial statement. Imposing this condition on our data leads to an unequal 
number of firm-year observations in both samples across years since a specific firm might fulfill the requirements to report an abbreviated format in one year although its matched firm does 
not (or: no longer) meet these minimum requirements. Further, unequal number of observations in the PE backed and non-PE backed sample are also a result of missing data on one or more 
elements of the financial statement items to calculate the compliance with the minimum criteria. A breakdown of a perfect match sample (i.e. sample for which a firm-year observation in one 
subsample was only incorporated in the analysis if its matching firm-year observation was also available – available on request) shows a similar pattern. We expect a high and surging number 
of PE backed firms compared to a rather stable number of non-PE backed firms that report complete financial statements around the PE financing event, since no specific event is taking place 
for the latter firms. Comparing non-government PE backed firms with government PE backed firms, indicates differences within the PE backed sample, dependent on investor type. For each 
(sub)sample, the number of firms that report complete financial statements (i.e. commit to a higher level of disclosure than legally required) is shown as a fraction of the total number of 
available observations. χ² test-statistics show differences in high disclosure patterns between (1) the PE backed and non-PE backed subsample and (2) within the PE backed sample, dependent 
on investor type (i.e. Government PE backed versus Non-Government-PE backed).  Nall = Total number of observations and NHighdisc = number of high disclosure firms. Note that: *  = 
significant at the 10% confidence level, † = significant at the 5% confidence level, ‡ = significant at the 1% confidence level.  
41 
TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables Including Differences in Means and Medians for High Disclosure Firms and Low 
Disclosure Firms (a) 
         
Panel A: Dummy variables  
 
Variable Sample NHIGHDISC NLOWDISC 
1 433‡  (27.58%) 1,137‡  (72.42%) PE 0 287‡ (14.92%) 1,637‡  (85.08%) 
    
XORD 1 78‡  (15.18%) 436‡   (84.82%) 
INC 0 642‡  (21.54%) 2,338‡  (78.46%) 
    
1 266‡  (21.61%) 965‡    (78.39%) LOSS 0 454‡ (20.06%) 1,809‡  (79.94%) 
 
 
Panel B: Continuous Variables 
 
Variable Sample N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Stddev Skewness 
         
HIGHDISC 720 1.875† 1.792† 0.000 4.317 0.916 0.202 LNAGE LOWDISC 2774 1.939‡ 1.946† 0.000 4.554 0.863 0.092 
         
HIGHDISC 720 0.579‡ 0.610‡ 0.005 2.634 0.337 0.517 LEVERAGE LOWDISC 2774 0.689‡ 0.725† 0.003 2.425 0.281 0.419 
         
FIX HIGHDISC 720 0.392‡ 0.330† 0.000 0.990 0.319 0.412 
ASSETS LOWDISC 2774 0.369‡ 0.325† 0.000 0.991 0.267 0.589 
 
 
42 
TABLE 4 – CONTINUED 
Panel C: Correlations 
  
Variable 
 
 
HIGHDISC 
 
 
LNAGE 
 
 
LEVERAGE 
 
 
FIXEDASSETS 
HIGHDISC 1.000 
– 
–0.029 
(0.077) 
–0.149 
(<0.001) 
0.033 
(0.048) 
LNAGE –0.033 
(0.052) 
1.000 
– 
–0.108 
(<0.001) 
–0.018 
(0.286)  
LEVERAGE –0.149 
(<0.001)  
–0.110 
(0.077) 
1.000 
– 
–0.120 
(<0.001) 
FIXASSETS 0.002 
(0.906) 
–0.002 
(0.919)  
–0.091 
(<0.001) 
1.000 
– 
     
 
(a)
 Panel A reports univariate proportionate differences in disclosure tendency (χ² test results) in relation to (1) receiving PE financing (PE), (2) reporting extraordinary income above 25% of 
current income (XORDINC) and (3) reporting a loss before taxes (LOSS). Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the continuous dependent variables for both the subsample of high 
disclosure firms (HIGHDISC) and low disclosure firms (LOWDISC). Two-tailed t-test statistics (Mann Whitney U test statistics) have been run to control for differences in means (medians) 
for both subsamples (HIGHDISC – i.e. firms that report a complete financial statement although legally an abbreviated format is sufficient – versus LOWDISC – i.e. firms that follow minima 
legal requirements and hence report an abbreviated financial statement). In Panel C, we provide Pearson (above the diagonal line) and Spearman (under the diagonal line) correlations for the 
variable of interest, HIGHDISC, and the continuous variables used in our multivariate analyses. Note that * indicates significance at the 10% confidence level, † = at the 5% confidence level, ‡ 
= at the 1% confidence level. 
 TABLE 5 
Panel Logit Regressions (Random Effects Model) (a)   
 
Model (1): HIGHDISCit = αit + β1it.PE + β2it.PEpost + γ’it.CONTROLS+ Uit 
 
Model (2): HIGHDISCit = αit + β1it.PE + β2it.PEyear-3 + β3it.PEyear-2 + β4it.PEpost + γ’it.CONTROLS + Uit 
 
Model (3): HIGHDISCit = α + β1it.PE + β2it.PEpost + β3it.Government*PE + β4it.Government*PEpost + 
γ’it.CONTROLS + Uit 
 
    
Variable Model (1) 
 
 
Model (2) 
 
 
Model (3) 
 
 
    PE 1.244†  
(2.62)  
1.916‡ 
(3.91)‡ 
–1.165•‡ 
(–1.91)‡ 
    
PEyear–3 / –1.533† 
(–2.04) 
/ 
    
PEyear–2 / –1.348• 
(–1.94) 
/ 
PEpost 2.280‡ 
(6.32)  
1.603‡ 
(3.91)‡ 
4.432‡ 
(6.69)‡ 
    
GOVERNMENT*PE / 
 
/ 2.752‡ 
(3.70)‡ 
    
GOVERNMENT*PEpost / 
 
/ –2.360‡ 
(–3.12)‡ 
    
LNAGE –0.420† 
(–2.27)‡  
–0.427† 
(–2.45)‡ 
–0.346† 
(–2.00)‡ 
    
FIXASSETS 0.414‡ 
(0.95)‡  
0.372‡ 
(0.85)‡ 
0.354‡ 
(0.78)‡ 
    
LEVERAGE –1.337‡ 
(–3.68) ‡ 
–1.355‡ 
(–3.75)‡ 
–1.602‡ 
(–4.18)‡ 
    
XORDINC –0.227‡ 
(–0.74)‡ 
–0.204‡ 
(–0.67)‡ 
–0.156‡ 
(–0.51)‡ 
    
LOSS 0.158† 
(0.72)‡ 
0.184‡ 
(0.83)‡ 
0.237† 
(1.07)‡ 
    
Constant –4.300‡ 
(–8.52)‡ 
–4.309‡ 
(–8.72)‡ 
–4.339‡ 
(–8.90)‡ 
    
N° of firms 716‡ 716 716‡ 
N° of obs. 3,494‡ 3,494 3,494‡ 
Wald Chi² 199.45‡ 198.31 189.78‡ 
LR test 1,517.37‡ 1,522.77 1,523.04‡ 
    
 
(a) This panel logit uses a random effects estimation method for three alternative model specifications. Panel logits techniques 
combine cross-sectional and time-series characteristics in one optimal model and meanwhile control for individual 
heterogeneity across firms, collinearity among the variables and firms dynamics over time.  For more information on panel 
logit analyses, we refer to Greene (1997) and Baltagi (2001). We model the disclosure decision of sample and control firms 
as a function of variables related to receiving PE both in the pre- and post-investment years (Model 1 and 2) and additionally 
check for differences between investor types (Model 3). For a rigorous description of all variables of interest and control 
variables, we refer to Table 2. Note that * indicates significance at the 10% confidence level, † =  at the 5% confidence level, 
‡ = at the 1% confidence level. 
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FIGURE 1 
Evolution of High Disclosure Firms Per Subsample (PE Backed versus Non-PE Backed) 
(a)  
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(a)
 This figure shows the yearly evolution in the percentage of PE backed versus non-PE backed firms that report a complete 
financial statement, although legally an abbreviated format is sufficient. Figure 1 shows a visibly higher percentage from t–1 
for PE backed companies (black line) compared to non-PE backed companies (gray line). This disproportion intensifies 
strongly after the PE investment year. χ² coefficients (reported between brackets below the relative firm-years) indicate 
statistical differences between the number of PE backed firms and non-PE backed firms that report complete financial 
statements for each firm-year. Note that * indicates significance at the 10% confidence level, † = at the 5% confidence level, 
‡ = at the 1% confidence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Percentage 
          (0.00)        (0.39)        (2.21*)      (5.87‡)      (10.83‡)     (14.37‡)    (10.35‡)     (9.34‡)     (9.07‡) 
 
Year 
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1
 We use the term private equity (PE) rather than venture capital throughout this study, based 
on the characteristics of our sample. According to the European Venture Capital and Private 
Equity Association (EVCA) definition, ‘venture capital’ is defined as a “subset of private 
equity and refers to equity investments made for the launch, early development, or expansion 
of a business.” Private equity is broader in meaning and is also used to define “external 
equity capital that is raised to strengthen a company’s balance sheet, to make acquisitions 
or to finance a management buy-out or buy-in” (EVCA Glossary). Since a considerable 
number of our observations (cfr. infra) refer to later stage deals and hence do not satisfy the 
exact definition of venture capital, we use private equity to label all our equity financed 
deals. 
2
 Recent studies acknowledge this shortage of attention and explicitly study earnings 
characteristics of unlisted firms in a regulatory setting where financial reporting 
requirements of unlisted firms are similar to those of listed firms (e.g. Ball and Shivakumar 
(2004), Hand (2005)). The importance and contribution to the economy of unlisted firms is 
high. In Europe, unlisted firms constitute over 99% of all private non- agricultural entities 
and hence are a non-negligible part of the economy. Figures for Belgium are similar to 
European averages in that about 99% of all Belgian firms are unlisted and they contribute to 
the large majority of total GDP.  
3
 This argumentation, however, implicitly assumes that entrepreneurs focus on one PE 
investment party at a time instead of ‘go shopping’ with several investment parties. 
Anecdotal evidence, however, shows that this is not always the case. Nevertheless, it still is 
relevant to study potential differences in disclosure behavior prior to the PE investment, 
dependent upon the specific investor’s type that eventually takes up the investment. 
4
 Our postulated relation is opposite to the one developed in Eng and Mak (2003), where the 
authors suggest and find a positive relation between government intervention and disclosure 
policy. The main reason why we expect this inverse relation is that we study unlisted firms 
with a rather small investor base, even after PE participation. Eng and Mak (2003) focus on 
a substantially different setting and study the disclosure behavior of listed firms leading to 
these different propositions. 
5
 This law is in accordance with the 4th European Directive which defines a Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprise as a firm that does not exceed two or more of the following 
criteria: 250 employees, EUR 20 million sales and EUR 10 million total assets. Each 
European member State is allowed to adopt lower thresholds into their national legislation. 
Hence, Belgium applies more stringent rules to classify a firm as a large versus small entity. 
Belgian law also states that if firms belong to a group, the minimum criteria are calculated 
on a consolidated basis (Royal Decree of October 8, 1976, art. 12, §2). Portfolio companies 
of PE investment firms, however, are an important exception to this rule since their business 
areas are too divergent and therefore do not have to be consolidated. Consequently, portfolio 
companies of PE backed firms still have the possibility to report an abbreviated financial 
statement if their individual financial statement figures do not exceed the regulatory minima. 
Note that the aforementioned criteria and amounts are the current minima and evolved over 
our observation period. Up to 1991, e.g., annual turnover had to be lower than 145 million 
Belgian Francs (BEF) and total assets should not exceed 70 million BEF. Between 1991 and 
1995, the maximum level for annual turnover was 170 million BEF and for total assets 85 
million BEF. From 1996 on, turnover and total assets minima were respectively 200 million 
BEF and 100 million BEF. Also note that BEF is the former currency of Belgium (before 
January 1, 2002), with conversion rate: 1 Euro = 40.3399 BEF.  
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6
 To some extent, our study empirically tests an extension of the feedback effect equilibrium 
model, developed by Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983). These authors develop a model in 
which asymmetrically informed agents are motivated to communicate their private 
information to a subset of uninformed agents, but can only do this through channels which 
convey directly useful information to competitors. Their model is drawn in a setting where 
firms have high R&D spending and need to raise financing but can only do this by reducing 
their informational advantage, i.e. by disclosing technological information publicly. In our 
setting, sample firms also have to decide on the amount of disclosed information which can 
be useful for competitors (e.g. sales levels, cost structures, etc.). However, the disclosure we 
measure is entirely financial and does not convey information on any technological 
advantage. 
7
 From those firms that switch to a higher disclosure strategy, about 95% stick to this complete 
financial statement reporting strategy in later years. This finding confirms our argument that 
a switch to a complete financial reporting is not likely to be reversed in a later stage and is a 
suitable proxy for a firm’s disclosure commitment. 
8
 One can be doubtful that these matching criteria are sufficient to find a proper match for each 
PE backed firms and that they might be insufficient to make sure that a PE firm and its 
matched equivalent are indeed proper matches. One potential problem that might arise from 
this incomplete matching is that our multivariate panel regression results are impacted by a 
self-selection problem, as mentioned in Heckman (1979). In response to this problem, we 
run two-stage equation models to capture these treatment effects (Greene, 1997) of which 
the results are reported in the sensitivity analyses. 
9
 Although we identified 556 PE backed firms and an equal number of matched firms, the 
available number of observations is in each year is lower due to the unbalanced 
characteristics of the sample.  
10
 Although the initial matching criteria worked well to identify a sample of non-PE backed 
firms that is comparable to the PE backed sample with respect to age, sector classification 
and size, the additional conditioning on complete financial statements and the fact that some 
firms have missing information with respect to the variables of interest causes these 
differences with respect to the average size in the samples of interest. 
11
 In unreported analyses, we also created dummies which were respectively activated when a 
firm’s extraordinary income is higher than 10% and 50% of current profit levels. All results 
remain stable with respect to these refinements. 
12
 Often, disclosure studies also control for a firm’s size and proxy this variable by (the natural 
logarithm of) a firm’s market value or by (the natural logarithm of) total assets. However, 
we do not possess data on the individual firms’ market value since we study data of unlisted 
firms. Moreover, controlling for size by looking at the firm’s total assets is inappropriate in 
this setting given that total assets is one of the three identifiable elements which determine 
whether or not a firm is obliged to report a complete financial statement (see Section about 
the disclosure proxy (3.2)). As a consequence, we opt not to incorporate a size variable in 
our analyses. 
13
 With respect to commitment to a higher disclosure policy, we already mentioned that of 
those firms that switch to a higher disclosure strategy in the pre-financing years, most firms 
stick to this high disclosure level. From the 43 firms that were identified reporting a 
complete financial statement from the pre-financing years onwards, only 3 reverse this high 
disclosure strategy in a later stage. This provides evidence that the analyzed disclosure 
strategy is to be interpreted as a persistent commitment to higher disclosure, and hence is 
expected to lead to higher economic benefits than an occasional switch. 
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14
 This increase in probability is calculated as follows: the initial proportion between high 
disclosure firms (= firms that report a complete financial statement) and firms that follow the 
legal requirements (= report an abbreviated format) is (720/3,494) = 0.206. The logit 
coefficient on PE (β1) = 1.244 and  corresponds to an odds ratio of e1.244 = 3.469. Multiplying 
the initial proportion 0.206 with this calculated odds ratio conducts a new odds of 0.715. 
Since the odds is the probability divided by the non-probability, we obtain the following 
equation: x/(1-x) = 0.715 or x = 0.417. This means that for each PE backed observation the 
probability of being in the high disclosure sample = 41.7%. This corresponds to an increase 
of (41.7% – 20.6%) = 21.1%. For the coefficient on PEpost, one can perform an identical 
calculation to estimate the increase in probability. 
15
 However, since the observations are matched in the (pre-)financing year, obtaining a 
perfectly matched observation per year is not necessarily our main concern. Differences in 
growth patterns and financial reporting policy are specific elements which make this dataset 
particularly attractive to analyze. Eliminating those firm-year observations for which no 
perfect match is available, inevitably also eliminates a substantial amount of useful 
information on sample and control firm characteristics and yields a substantially lower 
number of observations to be used in the analyses. For these reasons, we choose to report the 
results of the unconditioned samples in our main analyses.  
 
